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DISCERNING THE MEANING OF GONZALES V.
CARHART: THE END OF THE PHYSICIAN VETO
AND THE RESULTING CHANGE IN
ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE.
Peter M. Ladwein*
INTRODUCTION
Gonzales v. Carhart' represents a seismic shift in our nation's abor-
tion jurisprudence. Upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003,2 despite the lack of a health exception, it signals the end of what
can be termed the "physician veto." This veto can be globally defined
as the placing of dispositive weight in our nation's abortion jurispru-
dence on the autonomy and judgment of physicians who favor abor-
tion rights, at the expense of undergoing the more difficult and
deeper process of engaging issues of women's liberty and equality vis-
t-vis the nature of the unborn fetus and of abortion itself. While phy-
sician autonomy and judgment are deeply intertwined concepts, the
emphasis has shifted over the years from physician autonomy in Roe v.
Wade5 to physician judgment in Stenberg v. Carhart.4 From Roe until
the more recent Carhart decision, this dispositive weight-the veto-
has shielded the right to abortion in a manner that approaches the
absolute through the erection of an impenetrable wall of deference to
physician autonomy and judgment in this area of their practice.5
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A., Economics,
Northwestern University, 2004. Many thanks to Professor 0. Carter Snead for his
insight and wisdom as this Note was prepared; to my family, to whom I owe
everything; and to the Note Editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for the many hours
they spent in helping to make this Note a reality.
1 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). I shall refer to Gonzales v. Carhart as "Carhaf' through-
out this Note; I shall refer to Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), as "Stenberg'
throughout.
2 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. V 2005).
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 530 U.S. 914.
5 More than a few have taken this autonomy for granted in defending it. See,
e.g., Michael Brophy, Partial Birth Abortion: The Supreme Court's Ruling in Gonzales v.
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In 1973, Professor Laurence Tribe, writing about the just-decided
Roe v. Wade, characterized Roe as a case about role allocation. He
argued that, "when one sets aside the misleading language of Roe and
focuses instead on the substance of Roe's holding," one sees that the
Roe Court was "choosing among alternative allocations of decision
making authority" between women and the government, deciding in
favor of women's autonomy. 6 As a matter of role allocation, only after
Carhart has Professor Tribe been proven to be correct: the abortion
debate is now one whose terms are solely the scope of a woman's inter-
ests versus the scope of society's (a society that includes women
opposed to abortion) interests in the life of the fetus. No longer may
Carhart, MED. MALPRACTrICE L. & STRATEGY (Phila., Pa.),June 2007, at 1, 10 (noting
post-Carhart concerns about the increasing degree of intrusion by government into
the practice of medicine); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Abortion Politics: Clinical Freedom, Trust
in the Judiciary, and the Autonomy of Women, 298JAMA 1562, 1563 (2007) (noting disap-
provingly that "[b]ecause the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act criminalizes a medical
procedure recognized by the profession, it creates a chilling effect on the freedom to
practice in accordance with the exercise of clinical judgment"); Tom C.W. Lin, Treat-
ing an Unhealthy Conscience: A Prescription for Medical Conscience Clauses, 31 VT. L. REV.
105, 121 (2006) ("By protecting the autonomy of physicians, conscience clauses safe-
guard the freedom of choice for all citizens in a democratic society.... This auton-
omy applies to all physicians; no special exception should be made for those in the
area of female reproductive care."). Others frame the physician autonomy issue as
more closely linked to patient autonomy: impinging on physician autonomy should
be read as unconstitutionally impinging on patient autonomy. See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill,
The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86
TEX. L. REV. 277, 329-32 (2007) (discussing individuals' "constitutional right to pro-
tect their health by making autonomous medical treatment decisions"); Robin Toner,
Democrats Attack Bush on Women's Health Issues, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at A13 ("'We
know that five men don't know better than women and their doctors what's best for
women's health,' Mr. Obama said, alluding to... Gonzales v. Carhart."). The specific
sense of autonomy for physicians to perform abortions finds its roots in Roe. See
Brophy, supra, at 1-2 ("Under the right of privacy, physicians were granted in Roe v.
Wade the freedom to use their 'medical judgment for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother."' (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 165)); infra Part I. Assertions of
physician autonomy by doctors refusing to perform abortions demonstrate that the
"physician autonomy as protective of patient constitutional rights" argument is not as
neat as it would seem. See Courtney Miller, Note, Reflections on Protecting Conscience for
Health Care Providers: A Call for More Inclusive Statutory Protection in Light of Constitutional
Considerations, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JusT. 327, 340 (2006) ("Behind the [affirma-
tive] access [to abortion] issue lies a 'clash of autonomies:' patient autonomy versus
physician moral autonomy. The abortion choice, the legal right which is rooted in an
autonomy right, has provoked a call for a legal right to choose not to participate in
abortion ....").
6 Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1973) (emphasis omitted).
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unqualified deference to physicians be used to shield this core debate
from flowering in our jurisprudence. 7
Of course, in the "partial-birth abortion"" ("intact D & E") con-
text, this core debate may turn out to be quite ugly. To say that judi-
cial decisionmaking about this method of abortion has tested the
strength of the Justices' professional and personal relationships with
each other seems to be a serious understatement. In Stenberg, Justice
Thomas described the arguments of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg as
simply "too offensive[] to merit further discussion."9 Justice Gins-
burg, taking the unusual step of reading her dissent in Carhart from
7 Certainly, the degree to which Carhart eliminates the "physician veto" will
depend on how much precedential weight is given to Carhart in the future. If Car-
hart's precedential value is limited in the future to its specific facts, then this removal
of the "physician veto" will only apply to the Court's intact D & E jurisprudence.
However, if Carhart is read in light of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and its precedential value is understood as building on
Casey, then the Court will no longer be inclined to unquestioningly defer to physician
judgment in the future the way it did in Roe and Stenberg. To understand the marked
difference between Stenberg and Carhart in their approach to physician judgment, see
infra Parts III-IV.
8 Intact D & E (Dilation & Extraction) is distinct from nonintact D & E in that
nonintact D & E is a much more common procedure involving dismemberment of a
fetus older than thirteen weeks as it is pulled out of the womb. See Gonzales v. Car-
hart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1620-21 (2007); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 924-26. Intact D & E has
been used far less, usually after the fetus has reached sixteen weeks of age, and
involves delivering the fetus feet first up to the point where the skull can be collapsed
by opening it with scissors and vacuuming out its contents before delivering the rest
of the otherwise intact, but dead, fetus. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1621-22; Stenberg,
530 U.S. at 927-28. Exhaustive descriptions of the intact D & E and nonintact D & E
procedures and their history are available elsewhere. See, e.g., Barbara Jean Bailey,
Commentary, Congress Ignores the Parameters of the Health Exception, 27J. LEGAL MED. 71,
75-76 (2006); Gail Glidewell, Note, "Partial Birth" Abortion and the Health Exception:
Protecting Maternal Health or Risking Abortion on Demand?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089,
1095-99 (2001) (discussing, in addition, lower courts' treatment of bans on intact
D & E prior to the Stenberg decision); Scott A. Hodges, Comment, Constitutional Law:
Beyond the Bounds of Roe: Does Stenberg v. Carhart Invalidate the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003?, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 601, 603-05 (2004).
9 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1008 (ThomasJ., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Gins-
burg, each in separate concurrences, noted that the nonintact D & E procedure,
involving piece-by-piece fetal dismemberment as it is pulled through the woman's cer-
vix, was equally as gruesome as the intact D & E procedure in question, resulting in
there being no ethically principled way to ban one procedure but not the other. See
id. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 951-52 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Cit-
ing these "equally gruesome" statements, Justice Thomas responded: "The question
whether States have a legitimate interest in banning the procedure does not require
additional authority. In a civilized society, the answer is too obvious, and the contrary
arguments too offensive, to merit further discussion." Id. at 1007-08 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
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the bench, 10 called the Carhart decision "alarming" for "refus[ing] to
take Casey and Stenberg seriously""1 and took the Court to task for
invoking an "antiabortion shibboleth." 12 Besides these examples of
loose name-calling, the members of the Court used polar opposite,
and perhaps ideologically-driven, language to describe the particular
procedure in question. 13
This Note chronicles the life and death of the "physician veto" as
it has been used to shield the right to abortion ever since Roe.14 Part I
describes the two types of "physician veto" that Roe instituted: (1) the
predication of the right to abortion on the physician's autonomy and
right to privacy in her practice, and (2) the protection of the right to
abortion, behind physician judgment, all the way up to live birth with
the requirement of a health exception. Part II describes how Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey' 5 (1) attempted to
remove Roe's physician autonomy veto, and (2) maintained the health
exception as a sufficient veto to shield the abortion right behind phy-
sician judgment. Part III describes the Court's effort in Stenberg to
revive the predication of the abortion right on physician's rights16
(namely, deference to physician judgment) and explains how it
10 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 130 n.176 (2007).
11 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1640 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13 One can fully appreciate this marked difference in language among the mem-
bers of the Court only by reading the majority opinions and dissents in Carhart and
Stenberg. An illustrative example of the difference in language is that the wing of the
Court that would have struck down the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act as
unconstitutional described the intact D & E procedure in purely medical terms as a
"breech extraction of the body" and "partial evacuation of the intracranial contents"
of the fetus. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 928. The wing of the Court that did uphold the
federal ban cited testimony from witnesses to the intact D & E procedure that the
partially delivered fetus' fingers were "'clasping and unclasping'" and the "'little feet
were kicking,"' but when the physician opened the head with scissors the "'baby's
arms jerked out . . . like a flinch"' and as the contents of the baby's head were
vacuumed out "'the baby went completely limp."' Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1622 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 108-58, at 3 (2003)); see also Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 963 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (describing same); id. at 984-88, 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing late
term abortions in graphic, lay terms).
14 The way Carhart laid to rest the "physician veto" can only be understood in the
context of the climactic battle within the Court over the last eight years over the intact
D & E question; hence the citation of the evocative language supra notes 5-13.
Appreciating that context will enrich the future debate over abortion, the modified
nature of which this Note seeks to expose.
15 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
16 Of course, this revival was not meant to displace the primacy of a woman's
liberty set out in Casey. See infra Part II. Rather, it seems meant to move back toward
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thereby created the means for the present Court to eliminate the
"physician veto." Part IV analyzes the Carhart decision in light of all
the preceding discussion, describing the removal of the physician veto
that Casey had maintained in the health exception requirement.
It must be recognized that this Note is not meant to be a critique
or support of Carhart in terms of the substantive abortion issue at
question. Neither is it intended to be an in-depth analysis of the intri-
cacies of the Court's holdings in its abortion cases, as this has been
exhaustively achieved elsewhere in the sources cited throughout this
Note. 17 Rather, it is an attempt to understand the precedential value
of how Carhart will affect future abortion jurisprudence. In doing so,
it exposes for future academic and legal discussion the plain fact that
Carhart invites society to engage the abortion debate in a new way.
Our jurisprudence is now invited to consider the abortion right-with
its attendant philosophical and medical questions concerning
women's liberty, equality, and health, and the fetus' life and nature-
without abbreviating the discussion through unqualified deference to
the judgment of a physician who supports abortion rights.
I. RoE's STRICT SCRUTINY SOLICITUDE FOR DOCTORS: THE BIRTH OF
THE "PHYSICIAN VETO"
Roe considered abortion to be a "fundamental" right, and thus
held that any laws burdening abortion rights would have to withstand
strict scrutiny.18 In its application of the strict scrutiny test, the Roe
Court relied heavily on two "physician vetoes" to shield this newly
found fundamental right from regulation based on the states' inter-
ests in the life of the fetus. First, and most important at the time, was
the Court's predication of the right to abortion on the physician's
an absolute right to abortion, which Casey had called into question with its concern
for society's interest in the life of the unborn. See infra Part III.
17 For examples of such useful sources, see generally Susan Frelich Appleton,
Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physician's Role in "Pri-
vate" Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 183 (1985); Tribe, supra note 6; Bailey,
supra note 8; Glidewell, supra note 8; Hodges, supra note 8.
18 "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that reg-
ulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and
that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (citations omitted).
Only at the end of the first trimester was the state's interest in the health of the
mother "compelling." See id. at 163; infra note 26. Only at the point of viability would
there be a compelling state interest to proscribe abortion, and such proscriptions
would be valid only with exceptions for the life or health of the mother. See Roe, 410
U.S. at 163-64; infra notes 22, 65 and accompanying text.
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autonomy, protected by the constitutional right to privacy. 19 The Roe
Court expressed nearly unqualified solicitude for the physician's
autonomy in her abortion practice. Roe's progeny established the
constitutional permissibility of state regulations and policies that
might chill a woman's access to abortion,20 but it remained impermissi-
ble to chill the physician's autonomy in deciding whether and when to
perform an abortion. Second, Roe required that if a state restricts or
prohibits postviability abortions, the law must contain an exception
for the health of the mother, defined broadly as including "all fac-
tors.., relevant to the well-being of the patient."21 Whether an abor-
tion was medically necessary in this sense was to be determined solely
by the woman's doctor.22
Part II shows how Casey replaced the first physician veto-predi-
cation of the abortion right on unqualified physician autonomy-with
the shield of a woman's liberty, but kept the second veto-physician
judgment exercised in the health exception. It is first necessary, how-
ever, to recall the history and nature of the physician-autonomy veto.
This is because although Casey eliminated it as an express shield,
Stenberg backtracked to Roe's physician-predication model by predicat-
ing the right to a popularly disfavored method of late-term abortion
on deference, in the face of contested physician judgment, to physi-
cians who favor intact D & E abortion. As this Note is principally con-
cerned with the backfiring of this effort in Carhart, it is worth going
back to Roe to examine the origins of the physician veto.
A. Roe's Central Effect: Shielding the Abortion Right by Predicating It on
a Physician's Autonomy
By its language, the privacy interest Roe invoked was not intrinsi-
cally devoted-surprisingly-to protecting the privacy of a woman's
19 See infra Part I.A.
20 See infra note 45 (discussing abortion funding cases in which the government
policy of not funding abortions results in indigent women not being able to obtain
free abortions, but also in which physician autonomy was not burdened by the same
policies, allowing them to be constitutional).
21 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
22 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 ("For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." (emphasis added)); see
also Doe, 410 U.S. at 192 ("[M] edical judgment may be exercised in the light of all
factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant
to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health." (emphasis
added)).
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decision to abort her pregnancy.23 Rather, it was devoted to "vindi-
cat[ing] the right of the physician to administer medical treatment
according to his professional judgment," for "the abortion decision in
all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic
responsibility for it must rest with the physician."2 4 The Court deemed that
the Constitution protected the physician's decision, but not necessa-
rily the woman's. The physician's decision was to be completely unfet-
tered, aside from the usual malpractice remedies ,25 in the first
trimester, and relatively unfettered in the second trimester.26 This tri-
mester framework, protective of physician autonomy, "ensured that
23 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. Some commentators who believe that unrestricted
abortion is a prerequisite to gender equality have highlighted this facet of Roe quite
forcefully. While Roe made abortion legal and relatively available, these commenta-
tors were disturbed that the right to abortion, conferred by Roe, was not based singu-
larly on their status as women, but rather was based on their status as patients. See,
e.g., Appleton, supra note 17, at 192-200 ("Under the Court's approach, which
encourages states to advance medical reasons for their antiabortion laws, a woman's
constitutional right of reproductive control owes its scope, if not its very existence, to
the state of the art of contemporary medicine and the safety of its procedures.");
Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion and Sterilization Decisions:
The Use and Abuse of MedicalDiscretion, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 51, 52-61 (1983) ("Black-
mun subsumed the woman's right to privacy within the ambit of the doctor-patient
relationship, and ultimately subordinated her interest to the physician's."); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C. L. REv. 375, 382 (1984) ("Academic criticism of Roe... might have been less
pointed had the Court placed the woman alone, rather than the woman tied to her
physician, at the center of its attention."); see also infra notes 33-43 and accompanying
text (comparing arguments of these commentators that rooting the abortion right in
physician autonomy stunted gender equality efforts with that of Professor Tribe, who
argued that the physician autonomy root of Roe did not alter the fundamental sub-
stantive outcome of protection for the abortion right).
24 Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66 (emphasis added).
25 See id. at 166 ("If an individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising
proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are
available.").
26 Because the Roe Court found that "[m]ortality rates for women undergoing
early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the
rates for normal childbirth," id. at 149, Roe decided that "[f]or the stage prior to
approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician"
free of any state regulations, id. at 164. Under Roe, it was not until the second trimes-
ter that the state could interfere with the physician's conduct in order to safeguard
the health of the abortion-seeking woman, but these interferences in the name of
maternal health were expressly intended to not be undue interferences with physician
autonomy in providing abortions. See id. at 163 ("Examples of permissible state regu-
lation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to
perform the abortion; as to [her] licensure ... ; as to the facility... ; and the like....
[P]rior to this 'compelling' point [of viability in the third trimester] ... the judgment
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the woman's liberty interest would face off against the state's fetal
interest only with respect to exceedingly rare, post-viability abor-
tions"'27 and thus shielded the abortion right from regulation based
on a state's concern for the life of the fetus.
Certainly, the Court expressed solicitude for the liberty of the
woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy. However, it only did so
in a derivative way by characterizing the woman's choice as joint with
and dependent upon her physician's choice. 28 The Court did state
that "[t]his right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,"29 but
as Professor Tribe pointed out many years ago, the Court made this
assertion "without once explaining what it means by 'privacy.'- 30 The
implicit explanation can be found in the Court's language focusing
on the privacy of the physician-patient relationship and the physician's
autonomy. It was the physician who was to exercise completely unfet-
tered choice in the first trimester of pregnancy, for it was the physician
who, during the first trimester, "in consultation with his patient, [was]
free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. '31
The right to privacy in Roe was thus more a right for physicians to
perform abortions than for women to obtain them. 32 Derivatively, the
[of the physician to perform the abortion] may be effectuated by an abortion free of
interference by the State.").
27 Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey
and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 690 (2004). Of course, this reads into Profes-
sor Borgmann's argument about the trimester framework as protective of abortion
rights an understanding of the primary work that physician autonomy is doing at the
foundation of this protection. Professor Borgmann continued, "The strength of the
state's interest in fetal welfare is inversely proportional to that of the woman's liberty.
The Court could not expand Roe's recognition of the state's interest in the fetus into
the pre-viability stage without placing the woman's liberty fundamentally at risk." Id.
28 See Appleton, supra note 17, at 200 ("[O]nly the professional advice of the
physician would allow the woman to 'choose' and to do so rationally regardless of her
initial, uncounseled preference."); Asaro, supra note 23, at 61 ("The woman's right to
an abortion is not squarely recognized as such, as an aspect of her right to privacy;
instead it is tied to the physician's right to exercise his best medical judgment.").
29 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
30 Tribe, supra note 6, at 3.
31 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. It is also worth noting that in the same paragraph, follow-
ing the Court's privacy-breadth assertion the Court stated that "[aill these are
[health] factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in
consultation." Id. at 153.
32 While "physicians might have been less pleased with the decision," Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and the commentators cited supra note 23 would have preferred that the
right to abortion be premised on a "constitutionally based sex-equality perspective"
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woman benefited from almost complete liberty to obtain a first trimes-
ter abortion, but her physician could theoretically turn her away. Put
another way, in the first trimester of pregnancy, Roe only contem-
plated the physician as being completely unbound by regulations of
the state and the demands of nonstate actors (e.g., the woman),
whereas the woman could be subject to the refusal of the nonstate
actor who was her physician.
This physician-centered reasoning in Roe was not lost on com-
mentators at the time. The question for some was whether the lan-
guage meant anything at all, given "the reality that ... freestanding
abortion clinics ... will almost surely regard the family's or woman's
own decision as dispositive. 13 3 Professor Tribe acknowledged that Roe
and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,3 4 contained "much . . . that
[could] be read to suggest a desire to make the ultimate decision that
of a medical expert. '3 5 But he doubted that the Court "intended any
real medical veto over the choice to abort" and suggested that Roe's
"medico-technocratic terms" were little more than a public relations
effort to enhance "the public acceptability of its result. '3 6 Professor
Tribe was certain that "[i]n no event does the medical terminology
alter the substantive result."37
For some academics, however, the language meant everything
and the substantive result was less than desirable, for it "reinforce [d]
this image of the woman as an essentially passive receptor of her physi-
cian's wise counsel, as merely the object on which the physician must
be permitted to exercise medical discretion." 38 Then-Judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg argued, contrary to Tribe's nonimportance thesis,
that the physician-centered language of Roe was the very source of crit-
icism that the Roe Court "read[] its own values into the due process
and not on a "medically approved autonomy idea." Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 382,
386.
33 Tribe, supra note 6, at 38 n.168; see also Appleton, supra note 17, at 201-02
(discussing doctors who view their roles in providing abortions as purely instrumental,
rejecting the Roe Court's interpretation of their role as being one of counseling).
34 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
35 Tribe, supra note 6, at 37.
36 Id. at 38 n.168; see also Asaro, supra note 23, at 60 ("Tactically, of course, it may
well be that Blackmun's exaltation of the physician is simply offensively sexist rheto-
ric, and that what counts is the decision itself granting, certainly in the first trimester,
the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, as an aspect of the right to privacy.").
37 Tribe, supra note 6, at 38 n.168.
38 Asaro, supra note 23, at 60; see also Appleton, supra note 17, at 202 ("Yet, con-
trary to Tribe, the Court's language acknowledges the ethical aspects of each abortion
decision but appears to assign responsibility for them to the physician and not his
patient.").
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clause," which "might have been less pointed had the Court placed
the woman alone, rather than the woman tied to her physician, at the
center of its attention. '39 Still, whatever Justice Blackmun's driving
motivation-whether it was sexism,40 preferential concern for doctors
over women,41 or, most plausibly,42 a desire to shield the abortion
right behind a constitutionally impenetrable wall in the right to pri-
vacy in the physician-patient relationship-the practical effect was to
39 Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 382.
40 See Asaro, supra note 23, at 93 ("However offensive and sexist Blackmun's rhet-
oric of medical discretion may have seemed, as a practical matter it better served the
women's rights at stake than does the Court's newer 'freedom of choice' language.").
41 This may be a plausible argument, given that justice Blackmun was general
counsel to the Mayo Clinic for a decade. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, How a Ruling on
Abortion Took On a Life of Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994, § 4, at 3 ("The premise of
the opinion was that unwanted pregnancy presents women with potential medical and
social problems that 'the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will con-
sider in consultation' when deciding how to proceed. The point of view, reflecting
Justice Blackmun's sympathy for the medical profession developed during a decade as
general counsel to the Mayo Clinic, was that of a doctor seeking the ability to exercise
informed medical judgment about a patient's problem without government intru-
sion."). However, see infra note 42 for why this was not plausibly Justice Blackmun's
primary animating desire.
42 Roe has been subjected to scathing criticism, even by abortion supporters, and
the question is why Justice Blackmun would expose himself to such criticism. Profes-
sor John Hart Ely wrote in 1973 an article criticizing the Roe decision: "It is bad
because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and
gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be." John Hart Ely, The Wages of Clying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973). Professor Ely sup-
ported abortion, see id. at 923, but was struck by how poorly reasoned the decision
was, in his view. He opined, "Certainly, many will view it as social progress. (Surely
that is the Court's view .... )" Id. at 946. It seems highly doubtful thatJustice Black-
mun was bending over backwards because he was sexist; if he was sexist he would not
have written the opinion that struck down abortion restriction laws throughout the
nation. It also seems highly doubtful that he was bending over backwards just because
he cared so much about physician autonomy per se; abortion would be an oddly con-
troversial hornets' nest (that could breed what Professor Ely thought was bad reason-
ing) in which to exalt physician autonomy so resoundingly. Thus, it seems most
plausible that Justice Blackmun's aim was to shield the abortion right behind physi-
cian autonomy for the sake of the right to abortion itself. Ultimately, it may be impos-
sible to precisely determine Justice Blackmun's motivating intentions, as his opinions
through the years seem to have been written or unduly influenced by the law clerks
rotating through his office through the years. See generally DavidJ. Garrow, The Brains
Behind Blackmun, LEGAL Arr., May-June 2005, at 27, 28 (noting, after researching
Blackmun's recently opened archives, that "Blackmun allowed his clerks to play influ-
ential roles not only in drafting the two opinions [ Roe and Doe] but also in honing the
constitutional standards that made the two cases famous"). In any event, what is of
principle concern here is the effects of Justice Blackmun's language in Roe.
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shield a woman's right to abortion behind physician autonomy. 43 The
next subpart discusses how the cases following Roe largely used this
"physician veto" to impede various attempts by states to insert their
laws into the abortion decisionmaking process.
B. Roe 's Progeny Illustrate Physician Autonomy as a Shield to Protect the
Abortion Right
As Professor Appleton points out, Roe's progeny, particularly the
informed consent cases,4 4 demonstrate that Roe's physician-autonomy
rationale would shield abortion rights for some time.45 Justice Black-
mun, writing again for the Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth,46 was seemingly more concerned about a general
informed consent requirement's effect on doctors than he was about
any potential chilling effect on a woman's liberty to obtain an abor-
tion. Notwithstanding the increased stress that some have argued
informed consent laws may cause abortion-seeking women, 47 he wrote
43 See Asaro, supra note 23, at 91 ("Perhaps in the privacy of the doctor-patient
relationship lay the true preservation of the woman's right to an abortion. At least in
the absence of an express recognition of that right as an aspect of her right to privacy,
judicial deference to medical discretion serves as a second-best alternative.").
Whether it was the Court's intention to use physician autonomy as a shield for its
ideological preference for abortion rights is beyond the scope of this Note. The dis-
cussion below is concerned with the practical effects of this physician autonomy shield.
44 See Appleton, supra note 17, at 207-26.
45 Professor Appleton, however, would note that this was an imperfect, perhaps
even sexist, shield for the right. In another line of cases, the selective funding cases,
the Court "held that the government had not infringed any protected privacy right by
subsidizing childbirth but not abortion, even though such selective funding might
totally foreclose some indigent women from obtaining both therapeutic and elective
abortions." Id. at 205 (citing Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977)). Professor Appleton finds these
cases reconcilable with the idea rooted in Roe that it is not so much women who have a
right to abortion in Roe as doctors who have a right to complete autonomy in their
abortion practice. See id. at 205-06 ("In other words, in the funding cases the Court
upheld antiabortion laws that foreclosed some women's reproductive choices but did
not compromise a physician's exercise of medical judgment or decision-making
authority."); see also Asaro, supra note 23, at 88-93 ("[L]egislation not directly inter-
fering with the doctor-patient relationship has generally emerged from judicial scru-
tiny unscathed. Thus the ultimate erosion of Blackmun's medical discretion
approach has occurred in the Supreme Court's decisions upholding state and federal
restrictions on abortion funding.").
46 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
47 See Appleton, supra note 17, at 214-15 & n.226 (positing that providing a
woman with information such as details of fetal anatomy "may cause emotional dis-
tress"); Susan Frelich Appleton, More Thoughts on the Physician's Constitutional Role in
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that "it is desirable and imperative that [the choice to abort] be made
[by the woman] with full knowledge of its nature and conse-
quences .... [H]er awareness of the decision and its significance may
be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the extent of requiring her
prior written consent."48 The physician, on the other hand, might be
required, as with any other procedure, to tell the woman what would
be done and its consequences. 49 But he could not be required to say
any more for that would place him "in an undesired and uncomforta-
ble straitjacket in the practice of his profession. ' 50 As in Roe, the
Court's absolute solicitude for physician choice and autonomy over-
shadowed its concern for a woman's interest in obtaining an abor-
tion. 51 The effect of this solicitude for physicians was to veto society's
efforts to ensure that the grave choice to abort a fetus was a well-con-
sidered one according to its own standards.
Abortion and Related Choices, 66 WASH U. L.Q. 499, 504 (1988) [hereinafter Appleton,
More Thoughts] (noting that the Court, in Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986), posited that compelled information, such as
the probable gestational age of the fetus, "might heighten patient anxiety"). But see
generally Mary Anne Wood & W. Cole Durham, Jr., Counseling, Consulting, and Consent:
Abortion and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 1978 BYU L. REv. 783, 793 (arguing for a
model of rational decisionmaking that includes fully informed consent because
"when one adds concern for unborn life into the equation, the argument in the abor-
tion context for protecting the woman's autonomy in the sense of rational rather than
arbitrary choice seems overpowering").
48 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67.
49 See id.
50 Id. at 67 n.8.
51 Danforth repeats that "Doe and Roe clearly establish that the State may not
restrict the decision of the patient and her physician regarding abortion during the
first stage of pregnancy." Id. at 66 (emphasis added); see also Appleton, supra note 17,
at 209 ('Yet [the] footnote [cited supra note 50] hinted that the infringement of the
doctor's freedom, not the patient's, might prove a more pressing concern in future
cases."); Asaro, supra note 23, at 57 ("Although the case surely frees the woman and
her physician from the constraint of statutory requirements of third-party consent,
interestingly Blackmun twice gives his attending physician top billing. .. ").
Casting the Court's physician-centered approach into deeper relief, Professor
Appleton offered three reasons these provisions could have been struck down. First,
the Court could have read them as having the "unmistakable purpose of curbing
abortion." Appleton, supra note 17, at 214. Second, the Court might have found the
warnings on "abortion complications and details of fetal anatomy, pain sensitivity, and
legal status" to have conveyed "speculative, if not erroneous," information. Id. (foot-
notes omitted). Third, the Court might have found the legislation "notably one-
sided," failing to inform the women of the risks and burdens of carrying her fetus
through to birth. See id. at 215-16.
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City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,52 though
written by Justice Powell instead of Justice Blackmun, used reasoning
rooted in Roe5 to strike down detailed informed consent require-
ments and a twenty-four hour waiting period54 as unconstitutionally
infringing upon a physician's autonomy. The Court initially
remarked on the constitutional infirmity of what it considered to be
an attempt to "persuade [the woman] to withhold [her consent] alto-
gether" because the requirements were "a 'parade of horribles'
intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous proce-
dure. '55 However, the Court could not help but rely dispositively on
Roe's physician autonomy rationale. Thus, it struck down the Akron
informed consent requirements for the "equally decisive" reason that
they were an "intrusion upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's
physician,' 56 and invalidated the twenty-four hour waiting period
solely because it was "important to 'affor[d] the physician adequate
discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment.' -57 In a relatively
similar decision, the Court, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists,58 relied on its concern for physician autonomy in
striking down detailed informed consent provisions. 59
52 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
53 See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
54 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 422-25.
55 Id. at 444-45. The language concerning the impropriety of a state attempting
to influence a woman's choice to obtain an abortion was not only overruled in Casey,
see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.), but was also deeply unsatisfactory to Professor
Appleton. See Appleton, supra note 17, at 222-26 ("[The Court] came only to the
verge of recognizing that a woman may have rights superseding those of her doc-
tor .... The Court refused to allow the state to place any meaningful burden on the
physician while permitting the state to oversee the patient's receipt of information.").
56 Akron, 462 U.S. at 445.
57 Id. at 450 (alteration in original) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,
387 (1979)).
58 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
59 See id. at 759-61. For a detailed explanation of Thornburgh and criticism of the
Court's approach, see Appleton, More Thoughts, supra note 47, at 503-10 (arguing
that Thornburgh and the cases it generated highlight the need to "separat[e] . . . the
patient's interests in self-determination from the physician's interests in the
unrestricted practice of his profession" because the way in which informed consent
provisions in the abortion context are struck down, relying on physician autonomy as
an anchor, belies an "explicit approval of patient ignorance and physician paternal-
ism and its diminution of meaningful personal choice").
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C. The Birth of the Health Exception in Roe
The Roe Court expressed solicitude for the health of the woman,
but did so only by means of conceding that because second trimester
abortions included more risks than earlier ones, the state had a com-
pelling interest to protect the health of the woman. 60 However, close
examination of Roe's treatment of second trimester pregnancies, as
compared to its treatment of first trimester pregnancies, demonstrates
that this interest was derivative of the Court's foundational premise of
physician autonomy. As important an interest as a woman's health
was, it was not important enough to permit a state to regulate abor-
tions at all in the first trimester of pregnancy. 61 This is especially note-
worthy because abortion at any time is not without at least some small
amount of risk.62 Physician autonomy in the first trimester overshad-
owed a woman's health 6 3-and thus her interest in health was sub-
servient to the Court's solicitude for physician autonomy.
To say the woman's health interest was subservient to the physi-
cian's autonomy interest in Roe is not to say that it was unimportant.
It was highly important, as it provided the only avenue by which states
could regulate second trimester abortions so that physician autonomy
would be less than absolute during that period, even ifjust a little less
60 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
61 For an argument that Roe's "paramount" concern was "the health and well-
being of the pregnant woman," see Glidewell, supra note 8, at 1100-03. Undoubtedly,
this was a concern of the Court, but its failure to allow states to regulate first trimester
abortions at all so as to make them even safer for women demonstrates the Court's
eagerness to either shield physicians as physicians or to shield the abortion right
behind physicians' autonomy. It also calls into question whether women's health in
Roe was the "paramount" premise on which all other reasoning in the decision rested.
62 The Roe Court implicitly acknowledged as much in stating "that until the end
of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal child-
birth." Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
63 Certainly a woman could sue for malpractice and seek to surmount courts'
deference to the accepted practices of the medical profession. See supra note 25.
Structurally speaking, though, the physician was unfettered by state regulations dur-
ing the first trimester, conceivably making it easier for malpractice to occur in the first
place, and it is in that sense that physician autonomy overshadowed women's health
in Roe. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 30 ("The fact that childbirth causes more women to
die than do first-trimester abortions obviously does not warrant the Court's conclu-
sion that state controls over first-trimester abortion procedures must be limited to
requiring a licensed physician, or indeed that such controls must be limited to
whatever state regulations exist governing medical practice generally. For it is con-
ceivable that even very early abortions would in some particular category of cases pose
substantial and distinctive risks to maternal life or health unless specified procedures
were complied with.").
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so.64 The health interest was more important than even the state's
postviability interest in the life of the fetus, as any postviability regula-
tions or proscriptions of abortion under Roe would have to contain a
health exception, thereby placing the woman's interest in her health
above the interests of the fetus at all times right up until birth.6 5 Roe
and its companion case, Doe, gave extremely wide scope to this health
concern, permitting abortions to be obtained for a wide range of rea-
sons. 66 But even here physician autonomy played a key role: these
health concerns were to be filtered through the physician's "medical
judgment."67 Thus, the health exception gave doctors a second veto
against legislative attempts to restrict abortions, for, in light of the
broad meaning of "health" in Roe and Doe, it provided doctors the
discretion to procure a late-term abortion for a patient irrespective of
postviability legislative prohibitions of abortions.6
Thus, the practical effect of Roe--whatever the Court's particular
motivations-was to shield the constitutional right to abortion it cre-
ated behind the two interrelated "physician vetoes" of (1) physician
autonomy and (2) physician judgment, as conceived in the broadly-
defined health exception. As the next Part will explain, the health
exception would have a much larger role to play in shielding abortion
rights after Casey. It would not be until Casey that the woman's liberty
interest would stand on its own, fully independent of concerns about a
physician's autonomy. However, Casey proved to be a demonstration
that once the invincible wall of protection of physician autonomy was
removed, a woman's liberty interest would have to engage society's
interests in the life of the unborn in full daylight. Still, Casey main-
64 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("[A] State may regulate the abortion procedure [in
the second trimester, only] to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the
preservation and protection of maternal health."); supra note 26.
65 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64 ("If the State is interested in protecting fetal life
after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."); supra note 22.
66 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) ("[M] edical judgment may be exer-
cised in the light of all factors ... relevant to the well-being of the patient." (emphasis
added)); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care." (emphasis added)).
67 See Doe, 410 U.S. at 192; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. But see Bailey, supra note 8, at 72,
73 (arguing that "[m]aternal health ... is controlling in [Roe's trimester] framework"
and concluding that "the Court was ultimately concerned with protecting a woman's
health, even where competing state interests become compelling [postviability]").
68 But see Bailey, supra note 8, at 73 (questioning whether psychological health
alone could be "reason enough to justify termination of a pregnancy" because "Doe is
not clear regarding whether one factor by itself could be enough to terminate a
pregnancy").
2008]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tained Roe's second physician veto-physician judgment-in the
health exception requirement.
II. CASEY's REWRITE OF ROE: THE NEW LIMITATION ON THE
PHYSICIAN VETO
"[T] he state has legitimate interests from the outset of the preg-
nancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus
that may become a child." 69 With these words, Casey turned Roe's
premises completely upside down and inside out,70 though basically
adhering to the principle in Roe that the Constitution guarantees a
right to abortion, 71 if only because of the need to maintain the
Court's legitimacy in the public's eye.7 2 The Casey Court made clear
that the right to abortion was still operative, insisting that "[n]o evolu-
69 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
70 This point was not lost to those who would criticize Casey for not affirming
unfettered abortion rights. See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 27, at 678-79, 689
("[M]any do not comprehend the extent to which Casey in fact dismantled Roe's pro-
tective framework.... Casey's significant departures from Roe, including the undue
burden standard, stem from the joint opinion's enhanced regard for the state's inter-
est in the fetus."); Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 100
MICH. L. REv. 1980, 1983-88 (2002) (noting approvingly that with Casey, "professional
medical decisionmaking has disappeared" as the premise of a woman's abortion right,
but disapprovingly remarking that "[t]he Casey plurality opinion did not reaffirm Roe,
it only reaffirmed 'the central holding of Roe,'" and that after Casey "it is apparent
that only a sliver [of Roe] remains").
71 Casey purported to reaffirm "Roe's essential holding" that (1) before viability a
woman may obtain an abortion without undue state interference, (2) a state may
restrict abortions after fetal viability so long as the law contains a life and health
exception, and (3) the state has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy
in protecting the health of the woman. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. Of course, only the
second "reaffirmation" is a direct carryover from Roe. The "undue burden" test in
number one is a rewriting of Roe. See infra note 92. The state's interest in the
woman's health during the entire pregnancy is also a rewriting of Roe. See supra note
26; see also Borgmann, supra note 27, at 680-82 ("These changes were far more than
modest adjustments to Roe. Rather, they altered the very nature of the abortion right,
demoting it from a fundamental right to something more enigmatic and certainly
more fragile.").
72 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-869. The Court invoked stare decisis principles that
counseled against changing the law simply because it disagreed with abortion, see id.
at 864-65, central to which was the fear that entirely overruling Roe and returning
abortion policy back to the states "would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to
exercise the judicial power," because the Court could neither buy nor coerce adher-
ence to its decrees, id. at 865. It should be noted that the discussion in this Part
demonstrates that the Court did not follow stare decisis to the letter: it all but com-
pletely overruled Roe's legal framework and explicitly overruled aspects of Roe's physi-
cian autonomy progeny, see supra Part I.B, that were inconsistent with the state's
"legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn," see Casey,
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tion of legal principle has left Roe's doctrinal footings weaker than
they were in 1973. '' 73 Even assuming Roe's premises were in error, the
Court's opinion maintained that the error lay in its failure to give
teeth to the strength of the state's interest in protection of fetal life.74
Casey's new, potent affirmation of a woman's liberty interest,75
balanced against the state's interest in the life of the fetus, altered the
terms of the debate by removing Roe's first physician veto. 76 Roe had
meant that with the problem of irreconcilable disagreement over
abortion policy, doctors who provided abortions carried the veto
because they were to be given absolute autonomy in the first trimester,
and nearly impenetrable autonomy in the second trimester. 77 Casey,
for all its seismic shifts, quietly demoted the oracular physician's voice
in Roe into a voice that could only be heard through the requirement
that restrictions on postviability abortions must contain a health
exception. 78 In other words, legislative attempts to regulate abortion,
while still running into a constitutional wall, would not, in theory, be
automatically abbreviated by a physician's claim to an impenetrable
zone of autonomy in her abortion practice. Under Casey, the constitu-
tional wall protecting the abortion right would be constructed with
two pillars-liberty and the woman's health-derivative not of the
woman's relationship with her physician, but of her status as a
woman.
79
A. The First Pillar: Liberty Supersedes the Right to Privacy Justification
and the First Physician Veto of Roe
First, Casey removed Roe's foundation for a right to abortion as
consisting in a right to privacy. The common perception today that
abortion law is premised on a woman's right to privacy8° is flatly incor-
505 U.S. at 870 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.), while maintain-
ing the status quo in the key headline-making area of a basic right to abortion.
73 Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 (majority opinion).
74 See id. at 858.
75 See infra Part II.A.
76 See supra Part L.A for a discussion of the genesis of this first veto.
77 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
78 This remaining veto would become central to the debate over restrictions on
methods of abortion that apply pre- and postviability. See infra Parts III-IV.
79 See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
80 See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., Naughty Hary: Lawryering Without a License,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A21 (failing to mention the liberty anchor of women's
right to abortion and instead mentioning the "right to privacy"); Todd S. Purdum,
Defining Terms: The Supreme Court's Biggest Question, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, § 4, at 1
(noting that "'privacy' has become [a] neutral-sounding shorthand" for the abortion
right); Dan Savage, Op-Ed., Can I Get a Little Privacy?, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2005, at
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rect, as the Casey plurality only spoke of a constitutional right of pri-
vacy "between a pregnant woman and her physician."81 This comports
fully with the notion, discussed above,82 that the right to privacy in Roe
was more protective of a physician's autonomy, and, by extension, his
relationship with his patient, than of a woman's choice. Perhaps Jus-
tices O'Connor and Ginsburg, the only two women to serve on the
Court so far, recognize this. As Justice O'Connor's opinion in Casey
unambiguously stated, "[t] he controlling word in the cases before us
is 'liberty,' "83 not privacy.
In case there was any doubt that privacy is no longer the legal
premise of the right to abortion, and is not going to reappear any
time soon in the Court's abortion jurisprudence, Justice Ginsburg
herself asserted in her dissent in Carhart that "legal challenges to
undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate
some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman's
autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citi-
zenship stature. '8 4  Far from being a derivative-even if a substan-
tial-premise, a woman's liberty, as of Casey, was to be the grounding
premise of the right to abortion.8 5
A23 (assuming the privacy justification of Roe is still the controlling justification for
abortion rights in the Due Process Clause).
81 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (emphasis added).
82 See supra Part I.A.
83 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion); see also id. at 869 (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) ("From what we have said so far it follows that it is
a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some freedom to terminate her
pregnancy.").
84 Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (GinsburgJ., dissenting). Of
course, Justice Ginsburg was more interested in rooting abortion in equal protection,
as a matter of gender equality. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 386 ("Overall,
the Court's Roe position is weakened, I believe, by the opinion's concentration on a
medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-
equality perspective.").
85 Some who argue that women's equality demands completely unfettered abor-
tion note this shift away from privacy, and even laud it.
Although it is impossible to know for sure why the Justices in Casey
chose to focus on liberty rather than privacy, one reason that immediately
suggests itself is the Court's desire to reaffirm Roe without being dependent
on Roe's vulnerable constitutional doctrine. Thus, Casey avoided the quick-
sand of privacy jurisprudence by relying directly on the . . . liberty
interest ....
Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 121 (1995).
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The point is worth noting carefully because Casey completely
reversed the derivative position of the woman in Roe and, by doing
away with the privacy justification for the abortion right, made it clear
that "[w]hatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may
have as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative of the
woman's position."86 Rather than receiving absolute deference, "the
doctor-patient relation here is entitled to [only] the same solicitude it
receives in other contexts."87
However, as Roe itself acknowledged, 88 and as Casey stressed,89 a
woman's liberty to obtain an abortion is not absolute. Thus, the Casey
plurality did not mention Roe's strict scrutiny test 90 used during the
previous two decades. Rather, the Casey plurality adopted the "undue
burden" test 9 ' whereby a law regulating previability abortions would
be invalidated if it has the "purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
86 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.)
(emphasis added); see also Daly, supra note 85, at 126 (noting that the Casey plurality
"[d]irectly repudiat[ed] its former characterization of the doctor-patient
relationship").
87 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 886 ("And while the [twenty-four hour] waiting
period does limit a physician's discretion, that is not, standing alone, a reason to
invalidate it.").
88 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("[Alppellant and some amici argue
that the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy
at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With
this we do not agree.").
89 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.)
("Even the broadest reading of Roe, however, has not suggested that there is a consti-
tutional right to abortion on demand.").
90 See supra note 18.
91 Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter,JJ.). To
briefly summarize Casey's undue burden analysis, Casey upheld a detailed informed
consent requirement, admittedly meant to dissuade women from choosing abortion,
because it was not a "substantial obstacle" to the woman's ultimate choice. See id. at
883-85. Casey upheld a twenty-four hour waiting period requirement because
whatever health risks and financial costs might possibly accrue from waiting another
day for an abortion, they were so marginal as to not place a "substantial obstacle" in
the woman's path. See id. at 885-87. Casey also upheld a parental consent require-
ment, relying largely on established precedent rather than fully reanalyzing the ques-
tion in light of the "undue burden" test. See id. at 899. As noted infra note 94, Casey
struck down a spousal notification requirement as placing a "substantial obstacle" in
the path of abortion-seeking women who have abusive spouses and as offending mod-
ern understandings of a woman's equality in a marriage. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98
(majority opinion). The medical emergency provision is discussed infra note 105 as
part of the discussion on the facial health exception requirement.
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fetus. ' 92 This was not lost on Justice Blackmun in his concurrence, as
he argued forcefully for application of Roe's strict scrutiny standard.93
Justice Blackmun did not take exception to the "undue burden" test
itself, but rather praised it when arriving at a strict scrutiny-friendly
result in striking down Pennsylvania's spousal notification require-
ment.94 He took exception to the "undue burden" framework as used
to uphold the Pennsylvania statute's other provisions,95 which he con-
sidered to fail strict scrutiny review.96
Why did the Casey Court remove the physician autonomy veto
that had served abortion rights so well since Roe? The gender equality
theorist's reading is that Justice Blackmun's views had evolved for the
better. He, Justice Stevens, and the plurality "agreed that although
the Roe attitude towards women may have been acceptable in 1973, it
no longer fit[] women's role in society. '9 7 Another reading assumes
that Roe was not necessarily intended to be sexist and would instead
view it as concerned with physician autonomy as a means of protecting
the right to abortion at a time when perhaps a woman's liberty theory
might prove too politically untenable. 98 By 1992, the Court may have
felt that societal attitudes toward women had sufficiently changed to
viably premise abortion rights on women's status as women, instead of
on physician autonomy. But whatever its motivations, the Court was
92 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & SouterJJ.). For
a helpful explication of the "undue burden" test, see Glidewell, supra note 8, at
1105-08. Glidewell notes that "the Joint Opinion revised the standard of review for
restrictions on the abortion right, from a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny
review under Roe, to a 'liberty interest' subject to an 'undue burden' analysis under
Casey." Id. at 1105 (footnotes omitted); see also Borgmann, supra note 27, at 682-89
(arguing that the undue burden standard is devoid of content and that "the joint
opinion's determinations in Casey about which restrictions were permissible seemed
to reflect little more than the Justices' own views as to which kinds of burdens were
acceptable"). How this purpose and effect test was applied in Carhart is discussed infra
Part IV.
93 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
94 See id. at 924-925 ("In striking down the Pennsylvania statute's spousal notifica-
tion requirement, the Court has established a framework for evaluating abortion reg-
ulations that responds to the social context of women facing issues of reproductive
choice.").
95 See supra note 91.
96 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 934-40 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("Application of the strict scrutiny standard results in the invalidation of all
the challenged provisions ....").
97 Daly, supra note 85, at 128.
98 See supra note 42. But see Asaro, supra note 23, at 60, 93 (arguing that Justice
Blackmun was simply sexist).
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not yet willing to allow the debate between the competing interests of
women's liberty and equality on the one hand, and the life of the
unborn on the other, to occur entirely unimpeded by physician
vetoes. Instead, it maintained the health exception as a background
physician veto-a safety valve that continued to protect the abortion
right all the way up until live birth.
B. Casey's Second Pillar: Maintaining the Health Exception Physician
Veto as a Safety Valve
Casey maintained Roe's second physician veto99-the health
exception requirement-as a safety valve for women's access to abor-
tion. It did this even while raising women's health to a freestanding
premise in its abortion jurisprudence in two different ways. 00 First, it
removed the cloak of physician autonomy that Roe had placed over
the first trimester and replaced it with the principle that the state "has
interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of
the woman."101 Now, instead of waiting for malpractice to occur and
for the woman to go through the taxing lawsuit process, 10 2 the state
could say something about a physician's abortion practice from the
very beginning of the pregnancy to protect the woman's health. Sec-
ond, it confirmed the postviability holding of Roe, without modifica-
tion, that the state "'may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."1 0 3
Initially, given Roe's premises, this health protection might seem
to be geared only toward the idea of obtaining a safe abortion for the
woman. 10 4 It might also seem that the Casey plurality's language was
clear enough: if the government wants to restrict postviability abor-
tions, it must include a health exception as a facial matter in the law
99 See supra Part I.C.
100 Roe had taken the women's health interests to be derivative of a physician's
judgment. See supra Part I.A-C.
101 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion).
102 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
103 Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.)
(emphasis added) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)). It is precisely
the interpretation of this language-whether it involves a facial requirement or a bal-
ancing test-that would help fuel bitter division in the Court in Stenberg. See infra Part
III.
104 See supra note 26.
2oo8] 1867
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
itself. The tricky and unanswered question, however, would be what
the scope of that health exception should be.10 5
If any credence can be given to the idea that a woman may suffer
adverse effects from an abortion-whether it be physical harms 10 6 or
long-lasting psychological harms' 07-then it would appear that the
105 Roe and Doe had endorsed an unlimitedly wide scope for this health exception.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text. For a thorough history of the treatment of
the scope of the health exception (whether it should include only significant physical
health risks or should also include more liberal understandings of mental health
issues) over the years by the courts since before Roe, see Glidewell, supra note 8, at
1116-29. Casey, while not stating that the health exception necessarily need be nar-
row, upheld a medical emergency provision that allowed circumvention of the stat-
ute's other provisions in the narrow health circumstance of a "'serious risk of
substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.'" Casey, 505 U.S.
at 879 (majority opinion) (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1990)). The Casey
Court determined that since the lower courts read the provision to include the health
risks of "three serious conditions... : preeclampsia, inevitable abortion, and prema-
ture ruptured membrane," the health exception was wide enough to survive the
undue burden test. Id. at 880. Professor Caitlin Borgmann believed that this analysis
put into question whether the health exception after Casey was truly an independent
facial requirement.
[T]he opinion troublingly closed its discussion of the medical emergency
exception by concluding that "the medical emergency definition imposes no
undue burden on a woman's abortion right." That formulation seemed to
subsume the medical emergency exception within the undue burden test
rather than treating it as a separate, categorical requirement.
Borgmann, supra note 27, at 699-700 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 880). However, it
seems that at leastJustice O'Connor was crystal clear about the idea that Casey meant
the health exception requirement was facially required at all times. See infra notes
133-35 and accompanying text. In light of Justice O'Connor's clarity, it appears that
Casey held that the health exception was facially required and the only question was
what scope it must have to be constitutionally sufficient under either an undue bur-
den or independent health exception analysis. Professor Borgmann was optimistic
that Stenberg, discussed infra Part III, had clarified this problem. "In sum, [Stenber's]
treatment of the health exception requirement clarified important aspects of the
requirement that had been uncertain after Casey. The health exception requirement
is an independent one; it is not subject to the undue burden test." Borgmann, supra
note 27, at 713; see also id. at 706-13 (discussing fully this health exception argument).
In light of the Carhart decision, it appears that Stenberg worsened, rather than clari-
fied, the problem that Professor Borgmann believed existed in Casey. See infra Part IV.
106 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 928-38 (2000) (discussing arguments
about the comparative physical health risks of nonintact D & E versus intact D & E
abortions, including possible severe damage to a woman's reproductive system for
both methods).
107 See generally Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former "Mary Doe" of Doe v. Bolton, and
180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436684 (quoting 178 of 2000
affidavits on file in which women discuss their emotional distress after obtaining an
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state has an interest, under Casey, in seeking to prevent those adverse
effects, as long as the prevention does not constitute an "undue bur-
den" on the woman's election of the abortion. In upholding Penn-
sylvania's informed consent requirement, which furthered the state's
interest in fetal life and "express[ed] a preference for childbirth over
abortion,"'10 8 the Casey plurality (including Justice O'Connor) took
cognizance of potential adverse effects of abortion on a woman. "In
attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences
of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing
the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later,
with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was
not fully informed."10 9 Society, through its legislatures, had the last
word-not the physician-in determining that these adverse effects
might exist, and in determining what information a woman should
receive to "ensur[e] a decision that is mature and informed."'110
While the plurality's language, quoting Roe directly,"1 ' seemed
clear enough that there must be a health exception in laws restricting
abortions after fetal viability, that question remained to be tested after
Casey. These three elements-undue burden, health exception, and
the state's interest in fetal life-would be the core elements in the
Court's bitter division in its 2000 Stenberg decision and in Carhart as
the Court struggled over how to address attempts to ban intact D & E
abortions. The struggle would center around the "liberal" wing of the
Court attempting to use the physician-judgment veto that Casey main-
tained in the health exception requirement in order to justify consti-
tutional protection of the procedure. The "conservative" wing of the
Court would refuse to give such heightened deference to physician
judgment as a means of avoiding a direct assessment of the central
issues in the debate.
III. THE "HEALTH EXCEPTION" DEBATE IN STENBERG V. CARHART.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE PHYSICIAN VETO ERA
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her passionate dissent in Car-
hart, the Court was "for the first time since Roe ... bless [ing] a prohi-
bition [of abortion] with no exception safeguarding a woman's
abortion); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 835 n.68 (2007) (gather-
ing sources that advance the argument that abortion is harmful to women, but ulti-
mately not agreeing with them).
108 Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
109 Id. at 882.
110 Id. at 883.
111 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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health."'112 This Part describes how this occurred. Interestingly, the
Stenberg majority (which included Justice Ginsburg) was most signifi-
cantly responsible for the seismic shift in abortion jurisprudence that
occurred with Carhart's apparent expulsion of the health exception as
a bright-line requirement for laws restricting abortion. How? It seems
that the Stenberg majority was attempting to revive a long-lost pre-
mise-heightened judicial deference to doctors-from Roe as a means
of justifying constitutional protection for what even Justices Ginsburg
and Stevens acknowledged is a "gruesome" method of abortion.1 13
What is most telling is that the Stenberg Court took its focus off the
woman's liberty interest exalted in Casey, and instead spent its ink cre-
ating the "significant medical authority" test.
A. The Stenberg Majority's Pyrrhic Victory: Turning the Health
Exception into a "Significant Medical Authority" Balancing Act
Casey's plurality opinion affirmed without modification Roe's
holding that postviability abortions could be regulated, even pro-
scribed, "'except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.'"1H4 It
seemed to be categorical enough: postviability, a health exception in
any law proscribing abortions is required-end of discussion.1 1 5
Previability, regulations would be subject to Casey's articulated "undue
burden" test. However, attempts to ban intact D & E abortions
seemed to throw a wrench into Justice O'Connor's categorical
machinery in Casey. As the Court carefully noted, such bans affect an
abortion procedure that is performed both before and after the fetus
112 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
113 See id. at 1647; Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
114 Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.)
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
115 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Some commentators have argued,
in the wake of the Stenberg decision and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, that the
Casey Court was not as unequivocal as it might seem. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 8, at
74 ("Unfortunately, although the Casey Court defined 'undue burden,' it did not
offer specific guidance regarding what a 'health exception' necessarily entails....
[T]he failure of the Supreme Court to explicitly define specific aspects of the man-
dated 'health exception' became increasingly important with the introduction of the
partial-birth abortion procedure just months after Casey was decided in 1992."). How-
ever, notwithstanding uncertainty over the scope of the health exception requirement,
what seems unequivocal, at least to Justice O'Connor, is Casey's requirement that laws
restricting abortion have a facial health exception. See infra notes 133-35 and accom-
panying text.
THE MEANING OF GONZALES V. CARHART
is viable.' 16 Thus, one law would span both of Casey's categories, and
the question would be, which of Casey's tests-the undue burden stan-
dard or the health exception requirement-would apply? The
Stenberg majority's answer may have temporarily won the battle for rel-
atively unfettered abortion rights, but it ultimately enabled the Carhart
majority to remove the physician-judgment veto that remained in the
health exception requirement after Casey.
The majority's opinion in Stenberg indicates on its face that
Nebraska's law banning intact D & E abortions, since it applied
previability, 1 7 was unconstitutional for each of Casey's "two indepen-
dent reasons."' 18 First was the seemingly categorical reason that the
law lacks any exception "'for the preservation of the ... health of the
mother."1 19 It was apparently unconstitutional for the additional cat-
egorical reason that the law "'imposes an undue burden on a
woman's ability' to choose a [nonintact] D & E abortion, thereby
unduly burdening the right to choose abortion itself."120
It might appear from this superficial maintenance of Casey's
categories that the Stenberg majority simply assumed the greater hur-
dle (the no-undue-burden requirement) included the lesser (the
116 See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1632; see also id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("[Today's decision] blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between previability and
postviability abortions."); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 ("The fact that Nebraska's law
applies both previability and postviability aggravates the constitutional problem
presented."). One explanation of why Justice Ginsburg may have been uncomforta-
ble with this line-blurring in Carhart is that it strengthens the states' interest in the life
of the nonviable fetus, representing a further departure from what some consider to
be Roe's unjustified nominalism in calling an unborn fetus at whatever stage of devel-
opment a nonperson, while calling a baby a person at the instant of birth. See generally
Ely, supra note 42, at 924 ("[T]he Court's defense [in Roe of the viability line] seems
to mistake a definition for a syllogism."); Richard Smith, Location and Life: How
Stenberg v. Carhart Undercut Roe v. Wade, 9 WM. & MARvJ. WOMEN & L. 255 (2003)
(arguing Roe engaged in unjustified nominalism and that Stenberg undermined Roe in
this regard). Another explanation for Justice Ginsburg's discomfort might be the
argument, cast into stark relief with the debate over intact D & E abortions, that the
viability line drawn in Roe was not only arbitrary, but was also mere dicta in Roe and
Casey. See generally Randy Beck, The Essential Holding of Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75
UMKC L. REV. 713, 721 (2007) ("Rethinking the viability line would be analogous to
reexamining [Roe's] trimester framework .... ").
117 To be clear, if the law only applied postviability, then the undue burden analy-
sis would not apply. Rather, the law would only need to contain a life and health
exception for the mother. See supra note 71.
118 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (emphasis added).
119 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy &
Souter, JJ.)).
120 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy &
Souter, JJ.)).
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health exception requirement). The Court stated that "[s]ince the
law requires a health exception in order to validate even a postviability
abortion regulation, it at a minimum requires the same in respect to
previability regulation."'121 However, rather than rely on the simple
logical step that health exceptions are necessarily required previability
if they are required postviability, the Court accepted Nebraska's argu-
ment that "the law does not require a health exception unless there is
a need for such an exception." 122 In deciding that there was a need
for a health exception, "It]he Stenberg Court seemingly added an ele-
ment to the health exception" 23 and thereby conflated the application
of Casey's undue burden test with the health exception requirement.124
121 Id.
122 Id. at 931.
123 Bailey, supra note 8, at 77. Bailey notes that the Stenberg Court's health
exception analysis gave Congress legislative room, using Stenber's language, to justify
outlawing intact D & E abortions without a health exception requirement. See id. at
77-78 ("Although the Stenberg Court further solidified the necessity of a health
exception, the need for the support of a substantial medical authority paved the way
for passage of the [Partial-Birth Abortion Ban] Act."). Using Stenberg's health
exception analysis as ajustification for not including the exception in the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, Congress determined that "'a ban on partial-birth abortion is not
'required' to contain a health exception, because the facts indicate that a partial-birth
abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman, poses serious risks to a
woman's health, and lies outside the standard of medical care."' Id. at 78 (quoting
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note (Supp. V 2005)).
124 This seems to have caused some confusion among commentators,
demonstrating that it is a very real conflation of the health exception requirement
with the undue burden test. The Stenberg majority decided that a health exception is
required for bans on intact D & E abortions because of the disputed possibility of
increased health risks of obtaining nonintact D & E abortions vis-d-vis intact D & E
abortions. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930-38. It also decided that the language banning
intact D & E abortions could be construed as banning nonintact D & E abortions and
thereby placed an "undue burden" on women's ability to obtain late-term abortions,
since nonintact D & E abortions were the most common method of late-term
abortions. See id. at 938-47. Notwithstanding the separation of the issues just
described, this conflation of the health exception with the undue burden test led one
commentator to say that the first issue was "the extent to which Nebraska's ban on
partial-birth abortion presents an undue burden on the mother's right to an abortion
because of an increased health risk to the mother and, second, if Nebraska's ban
extends to the dilation and evacuation [nonintact D & E] procedure." Richard Collin
Mangrum, Stenberg v. Carhart: Poor Interpretivist Analysis, Unreliable Expert Testimony,
and the Immorality of the Court's Invalidation of Partial-Birth Abortion Legislation, 34
CREIGHTON L. REv. 549, 552 (2001). Another commentator argued:
Eliminating the [intact D & E] procedure as an option creates an undue
burden to the woman's right to an abortion because when she is faced with
alternatives that pose greater risks to her health, she may be forced to
choose a riskier procedure or even opt out of an abortion altogether.
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That added element would be the "substantial medical authority"
test. 125
In upholding a twenty-four hour waiting period requirement as
not imposing an undue burden on a woman's ability to decide to
abort her pregnancy, the Casey Court engaged a calculus of risks and
costs. It determined that the marginal increase in these risks and costs
was not so onerous as to constitute an "undue burden." 126 In uphold-
ing the medical emergency provision in the Pennsylvania statutes in
question, the Casey Court did not engage in any calculus at all: the
requirement was categorical and was satisfied by the lower courts hav-
ing read a health exception into the medical emergency provision. 127
The conflation in Stenberg of these two tests occurs when the
majority engaged in an "undue burden"-like calculus to argue that
Nebraska was wrong and that a health exception was indeed required
in its law. That calculus involved the question of "whether protecting
women's health requires an exception for those infrequent occasions"
where a doctor believes that a woman's health requires an intact
D & E. 128 The Court's answer was that a statute would be required to
have a facial health exception if "in the process of regulating the meth-
ods of abortion, [it] imposed significant health risks."129 To decide
whether Nebraska's statute imposed significant health risks, the Court
exhaustively recognized that conflicting and uncertain arguments
were present before it concerning the marginal risks entailed in ban-
ning intact D & E abortions without a health exception °30 and
"adopted a lenient test for determining whether one abortion proce-
dure is safer than another." 131 Under this test, the Court held that a
Janeen F. Berkowitz, Stenberg v. Carhart: Women Retain Their Right to Choose, 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 337, 379 (2001).
125 See Bailey, supra note 8, at 77.
126 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
127 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
128 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 934.
129 Id. at 931 (second emphasis added).
130 See id. at 931-38.
131 Glidewell, supra note 8, at 1139. Glidewell continues:
Although it was undisputed in [Stenberg] that there were no medical studies
documenting the comparative safety of [intact D & E] and [nonintact]
D & E, the majority found this fact unimportant because there was substan-
tial medical authority that [intact D & E] was medically necessary for some
women in some circumstances.
Id. Justice Kennedy complained in his dissent in Stenberg that the "substantial medical
evidence" standard of the majority seemed met only by "the individual views of Dr.
Carhart and his supporters." Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 969 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The
majority responded that neither "absolute [medical] necessity" for the intact D & E
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health exception was required where "significant medical authority sup-
ports the proposition that in some circumstances, [intact D & E]
would be the safest procedure."
1 32
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, seemed somewhat uncom-
fortable with the majority's transformation of the health exception
requirement-which she, along with the Court, had categorically car-
ried over from Roe into Casey-into a balancing test. Her concur-
rence mirrors the majority's structure in addressing the health
exception and then the undue burden test, but is much more categor-
ical about the need for a health exception. She was crystal clear that
the undue burden test was an "alternative and independent ground"
from the health exception requirement, even while agreeing with Jus-
tice Breyer that the greater included the lesser so that previability
abortion restrictions required a health exception. 133 Her insistence
that the "lack of a health exception [in the Nebraska statute] necessa-
rily renders the statute unconstitutional" 134 betrays an uneasiness with
the majority's decision to open the possibility that a health exception
might not be required in an abortion restriction. 13 5
procedure nor "unanimity of medical opinion" was necessary to meet the "substantial
medical authority" standard. See id. at 937 (majority opinion). Rather, there was a
'judicial need to tolerate responsible differences of medical opinion" by defaulting to
the view that a health exception is required since, if the doctors opposed to banning
intact D & E turn out to be wrong in their estimations that a woman's health might
require the procedure, the worst that could happen is that "the exception will simply
turn out to have been unnecessary." See id.
132 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 932 (emphasis added); see also id. at 937 ("Where a signifi-
cant body of medical opinion believes a procedure may bring with it greater safety for
some patients and explains the medical reasons supporting that view, we cannot say
that the presence of a different view by itself proves the contrary." (emphasis added)).
133 See id. at 948 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134 Id. (emphasis added).
135 Gail Glidewell suggests that Justice O'Connor was complicit with the majority
in entertaining the possibility that " [i] f there were adequate alternative measures for a
woman safely to obtain an abortion before viability, it is unlikely that prohibiting the
[intact D & E] procedure alone would 'amount in practical terms to a substantial
obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.'" See Glidewell, supra note 8, at 1115 (quot-
ing Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951 (O'ConnorJ., concurring)). However, Justice O'Connor
states immediately thereafter that "[t]hus, a ban on partial birth abortion that only
proscribed the [intact D & E] method of abortion and that included an exception to
preserve the life and health of the mother would be constitutional in my view." Stenberg, 530
U.S. at 951 (emphasis added). Glidewell notes that "[i]t is revealing that Justice
O'Connor's pointed statements did not make it into the majority opinion." Glidewell,
supra note 8, at 1115. However, it is revealing not for the reason that Justice
O'Connor agreed with the majority that a health exception might not be necessary,
but rather for the reason thatJustice O'Connor was taking the majority to task for not
holding that the health exception was facially required, end of discussion.
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While Nebraska lost this particular battle, the importance of
Nebraska's argument cannot be overstated. Rather than saying "a
health exception is necessary as per Roe and Casey" and calling it a
day, the Stenberg majority allowed the possibility-even if only to reject
it in this instance-that a health exception might not be required in a
law restricting abortion. As will be seen,136 this possibility was seized
upon in Carhart to come to almost the exact opposite conclusion that
Stenberg had arrived at less than seven years beforehand.
B. What Was Stenberg's Goal? Reviving the Physician Judgment Veto to
Shield Unfettered Abortion Rights
The trouble for the Stenberg majority arose with the claim that
intact D & E is a procedure that is never necessary for the health of
the mother.13 7 Casey reaffirmed Roe's "necessary, in appropriate med-
ical judgment" language. 1 38 The implicit question in Stenberg was
whether this language meant that (1) the law must simply have a facial
health exception allowing physicians to autonomously make their own
medical determinations about the health-necessity of a late-term abor-
tion; (2) the law only requires a health exception when the courts
decide "appropriate medical judgment" deems it necessary; or (3) the
law only requires a health exception when the legislatures determine
that "appropriate medical judgment" deems it necessary. Either of
the first two answers would involve judicial deference to physicians.
The first answer might provide too much deference to physicians
because of the need to protect women's health from errant physicians
adopting unsafe abortion procedures. 1 9 The Court's choice of the
136 See infra Part IV.
137 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937-38.
138 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
139 The Stenberg majority was careful to argue against Justice Kennedy's assertion
that its decision was granting "'unfettered discretion'" to physicians "in their selection
of abortion methods." Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938 (quoting id. at 969 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting)). Justice Kennedy argued in dissent that "[i]n deferring to the physician's
judgment, the Court turns back to cases decided in the wake of Roe, cases which gave
a physician's treatment decisions controlling weight" and that " [n]o doubt exists that
today's holding is based on a physician-first view which finds its primary support in
that now-discredited case [City of Akron]." Id. at 968-69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Kennedy, who was one of the Caseyjoint opinion's authors, continued, "Casey recog-
nized the point, holding the physician's ability to practice medicine was 'subject to
reasonable . . . regulation by the State' and would receive the 'same solicitude it
receives in other contexts.'" Id. at 969 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter,JJ.)).
For what the Stenberg majority's intentions likely were in stating it was not granting
.unfettered discretion" to physicians, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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second answer over the third might imply that it was placing the
health exception requirement at risk in the name of its own self-
aggrandizement. 140 However, there could be reasons beyond pure
self-aggrandizement to choose this path: the health exception require-
ment would arguably be at less risk in the hands of a pro-abortion-
rights majority on the Court than in the hands of legislatures seeking
to curb abortion. Moreover, assuming the Stenberg majority did not
intend to place the health exception requirement at risk in the pro-
cess of arguably granting physicians "absolute veto power over any
abortion legislation even post viability," 141 there must have been some-
thing else driving the Court. It would seem uncommonly unwise for
that majority to risk a detriment to abortion rights even in the name
of its own aggrandizement. That something else may have been an
effort to reestablish physician judgment as paramount in questions of
abortion regulation, as a means to protect the abortion right. 142
As noted above, the legal reasoning that went into Roe was mostly
defunct after Casey.143 The privacy justification of Roe, protecting a
physician's autonomy and relationship with his patient, was sup-
planted by Casey's liberty justification. 144 Casey limited that liberty jus-
tification by abolishing the trimester framework in order to give real
140 Justice Kennedy expressed concern about this when he argued that "it is pre-
cisely where such [medical] disagreement exists that legislatures have been afforded
the widest latitude." Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 970 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). He thus saw the Court as taking the question of medical regulation in the
face of medical disagreement out of the traditional hands of the legislature. It seems
doubtful that the Stenberg majority did this only to aggrandize the Court; rather, it
seems that aggrandizement, if Justice Kennedy's argument is correct, is a mere
byproduct of the Court seeking to shield abortion rights from legislative incursion by
deferring to the judgment of pro-abortion physicians.
141 Mangrum, supra note 124, at 579. The caveat to the absoluteness of this veto
power would be that the Court must grant it in the first place.
142 Undoubtedly, the Stenberg majority's language that its decision was not grant-
ing "unfettered discretion" to physicians was not an indication that it was eager to
limit physician autonomy, but rather seems to be an indication that it was acknowl-
edging that too much physician autonomy could be dangerous to women's health.
Short of that "too much autonomy" line, the Stenbergmajority precisely relied on phy-
sician judgment to shield access to intact D & E abortions. Gail Glidewell's helpful
explication of the Stenberg decision casts this into relief when she argues that the
Stenberg Court's decision was entirely premised on a calculation of the speculative, but
nonetheless theoretically possible, health risks to women of banning intact D & E. See
Glidewell, supra note 8, at 1110-13. It was physicians who argued this risk was possi-
ble, and rather than turn to a notion of women's liberty in striking down a ban on
intact D & E, the Court turned to a new "significant medical authority" test as the
shield it would use to protect the use of intact D & E as an abortion method.
143 See supra Part II.
144 See supra Part II.A.
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teeth to the state's interest in fetal life. Legally, all that was left of Roe
was the postviability requirement that restrictions on abortion must
include a life and health exception. And that health exception would
be precious indeed for advocates of abortion rights, for depending on
how broadly it would be interpreted, it could arguably circumvent
postviability abortion restrictions with relative ease. 145
Why would the Stenberg majority, including Justice Ginsburg,
engage in logic that would open the door to the upholding of a law
that omitted a health exception? The compelling answer seems to be
that the Stenberg majority sought to use the physician-judgment veto
remaining after Casey to justify striking down a ban on a popularly
disfavored method of late-term abortion. As Justice Stevens com-
plained in his concurrence, "[I] t [is] impossible for me to understand
how a State has any legitimate interest in requiring a physician to fol-
low any procedure other than the one that he or she reasonably believes
will best protect the woman in her exercise of this constitutional lib-
erty. ' 146 It would be one thing to simply require a facial health excep-
tion without much comment. It was entirely another to shore up the
Stenberg decision with deference to physician judgment that resonates
with common instinct that a doctor knows better than politicians
whether intact D & E might be required late in a pregnancy, even
though that doctor's decisionmaking may be colored by a fervent
favoring of abortion rights.
However, there seemed more at play in Stenberg than just politi-
cians versus doctors: there is an element of desiring to keep the abor-
tion debate out of society and its legislatures in order to protect the
abortion right from weakening. Even though Nebraska's law would
"not save any fetus from destruction"14 7
-or, to state it differently,
even though Nebraska's law would not prevent a single woman from
obtaining the abortion she seeks-Justice Ginsburg was concerned
that "state legislators seek to chip away at the private choice shielded
by Roe v. Wade."1 48 While she prefers the abortion right to be pre-
mised solely on a woman's liberty, 49 she pulled out the physician veto
card in this case of "emotional uproar" 150 as she, too, was eager to take
the abortion prerogative out of society's purview and place it back in
145 See supra note 105.
146 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
147 Id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
148 Id. at 952; see also id. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring) (commenting thatJustice
Ginsburg had identified the underlying reason of the legislation).
149 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
150 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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the physician's hands. She rounded out her concurrence by quoting
Justice Stevens' comment that this should all be about what the "doctor
'reasonably believes"' is best for the woman's exercise of her abortion
rights. 15 1
While reading such intentions into Stenberg's majority opinion
might be a tricky and uncertain business, the "significant body of med-
ical opinion" test articulated in Stenberg strongly suggests its efforts to
renew the physician veto of Roe. Where Casey stated that the physi-
cian's position was derivative of the woman, 152 Stenberg implies that
the woman's position is once again derivative of the physician's.
Stenberes reasoning does not root itself in a woman's liberty or equal-
ity, but rather hinges entirely on her physician's judgment that a spe-
cific abortion procedure is necessary. There seems no other
explanation for engaging in an argument so likely to result in a pyr-
rhic victory-likely, because once the categorical, bright-line health
exception rule is transformed into the balancing calculus already han-
dled by the "undue burden" test, the safety valve against any restric-
tions of abortions, whether pre- or postviability, is removed. 153
IV. CARHART- REMOVING THE PHYSICIAN VETO AND ALLOING THE
ABORTION DEBATE TO TAKE FULL BLOOM
The Stenberg Court's efforts to revive solicitude for medical opin-
ion regarding abortion allowed the Carhart Court "for the first time
since Roe... [to] bless[] a prohibition with no exception safeguarding
a woman's health."'1 54 Justice Kennedy was obviously displeased that
the Stenberg Court had taken the undue burden test of Casey to mean
some sort of strict scrutiny that would, like Roe, minimize the state's
interest in the life of the fetus155 and maximize the autonomy of the
151 See id. at 952 (emphasis added).
152 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
153 The efficacy of the safety valve obviously depends on the scope of "health." See
supra note 105.
154 Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (GinsburgJ., dissenting); see
also Hill, supra note 5, at 319 ("[I]n a clear reversal of its prior approach to abortion
cases-including that taken in [ Stenberg]-the Court held that the absence of a health
exception did not require invalidation of the PBABA on its face."); 0. Carter Snead,
Unenumerated Rights and the Limits of Analogy: A Critique of the Right to Medical Self-
Defense, 121 HARV. L. REv. F. 1, 4 (2007), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/
issues/120/mayO7/snead.pdf ("Carhart seems to represent a departure from the virtu-
ally absolute privilege of a woman's health over the state's interest in promoting
respect for fetal human life.").
155 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 960-61, 972 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Casey deci-
sion turned aside any contention that a person has the right to decide whether to
have an abortion without interference from the State, and rejected a strict scrutiny
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physician. 156 He wote for the Carhart majority that a state's interest
in the unborn "cannot be set at naught by interpreting Casey's
requirement of a health exception so it becomes tantamount to
allowing a doctor to choose the abortion method he or she might prefer.'1 57
The independent requirements of Casey (the undue burden test
and the health exception), muddled by the Stenberg Court in an effort
to revive Roe's physician veto, would, in Carhart, be folded together
into the undue burden test,158 which asks "'if [the law's] purpose or
effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.' '' 159 In analyzing the
law's purpose, the Carhart majority decided that if the law's purpose is
to further the state's interest in fetal life, then it will not require a
health exception. Analyzing the law's effect, Carhart reconfigures
Stenberg's strict presumption in favor of medical opinion that favors
abortion into a presumption in favor of society's wishes.
standard of review as incompatible with the recognition that there is a substantial
state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy." (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
156 See id. at 968-72 ("A ban which depends on the 'appropriate medical judg-
ment' of Dr. Carhart is no ban at all. He will be unaffected by any new legislation.
This, of course, is the vice of a health exception resting in the physician's discretion." (empha-
sis added)).
157 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633 (emphasis added). It should be recalled thatJustice
Kennedy coauthored the Caseyjoint opinion that set out to reverse the first physician
veto of Roe. See supra Part II.A.
158 See Hill, supra note 5, at 322. Professor Hill argues that Carhart is a "signifi-
cant" modification of Stenberg because the Carhart Court
analyzed the need for a health exception under the "undue burden" rubric,
rather than treating it as a separate and independent constitutional require-
ment. Although some language in Casey could be read to suggest that the
health exception was subject to undue burden analysis, the consensus had
previously been that the health exception was a freestanding constitutional
requirement.
Id. However, the discussion of Stenberg, supra Part III, indicates that Carhart did noth-
ing to modify the fact that Stenberg allowed the possibility that a facial health excep-
tion might not be required. Carhart is different from Stenberg because of the way the
Court treats the presence of medical disagreement, see infra Part IV.B, and not
because of the determination that a facial health exception may not be required in
laws restricting abortion procedures. If Carhart is a "significant" modification of
Stenberg, then Stenberg is a complete hollowing out of all that remained of Roe's actual
legal premises (as opposed to its substantive abortion-right holding) after Casey with
respect to the physician veto in the health exception requirement.
159 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1632 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.)).
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A. Examining the Purpose of the "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban ": The State
Interests Cited in Carhart Show No Special Solicitude
for Physicians
Physicians are not entitled to ignore regulations that direct them to
use reasonable alternative procedures. The law need not give abor-
tion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical prac-
tice, nor should it elevate their status above other physicians in the
medical community.
-Justice Anthony Kennedy160
Unpacking Justice Kennedy's groundbreaking statement that a
health exception does not mean a physician is "unfettered," one finds
the Court, for the first time, explicitly making a conscious effort to
flesh out what state interests are corollary to Casey's newly vivified
interest in the life of the fetus. This is done while repeatedly disavow-
ing any physician judgment or autonomy veto that might be raised in
an attempt to foreclose any jurisprudential consideration of these
state interests.
For example, concern for the health of the woman, which in Roe
meant concern only to ensure she receives a safe abortion, 161 now
expressly includes concerns about the disputed adverse effects of
abortion on women. 16 2 While the Court could not reliably quantify
the phenomenon, it noted that "it seems unexceptionable to con-
clude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life
they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of
esteem can follow." 1 63 The Court expressed concern that physicians
160 Id. at 1636. For an in-depth discussion of two competing doctrines in our
nation's jurisprudence regarding physician autonomy-public health restrictions of
autonomy versus absolute physician autonomy-and how Carhart represents a shift
from the notion of abortion as matter of physician autonomy to abortion as a matter
of public health, see generally Hill, supra note 5.
161 See supra note 26.
162 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
163 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. Many have seized upon this specific language of
the Court as being offensively paternalistic. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 5, at 1564
("The view that the state must protect women making autonomous reproductive deci-
sions is premised on an antiquated notion about a woman's place in society and
under the Constitution. This new paternalism implies that women are confused when
they seek an abortion; or that abortion will cause feelings of guilt, shame, and sad-
ness."). Yet, in evaluating such arguments, it must be recalled that it was a woman,
Justice O'Connor, who first recognized in Casey the potentially adverse effects of abor-
tion on women. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. It must also be noted that
it was Mary Doe, from Doe v. Bolton, who filed the amicus brief in Carhart cataloguing
the apparent fact that some-as yet indeterminate-percentage of women who have
had an abortion have suffered long-term ill effects from their decision. See generally
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were withholding information from women about what an abortion
exactly entails, aggravating psychological harm to some women. 164
Thus, the Court opined in dicta that physicians ought not have full
autonomy to "prefer not to disclose precise details of the means that
will be used" and that "[i]t is . . .precisely this lack of information
concerning the way in which the fetus will be killed that is of legiti-
mate concern to the State.' 6 5
Another corollary interest that the Carhart Court recognized is
that of "'drawing a bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and
infanticide."'" 6 6 The prerogative of drawing that line is not to lie with
the physician, as it implicitly did in Stenberg.1 67 Carhart sees it as a
legitimate interest for society to say that a procedure has a "disturbing
similarity to the killing of a newborn infant."1 68 Justice Stevens took
great exception to Nebraska's advancement of this interest in Stenberg,
pointing out that nonintact D & E abortion is "equally gruesome" and
that calling intact D & E any more akin to infanticide than nonintact
D & E "is simply irrational."'1 69 Justice Ginsburg has been equally mys-
tified at the attempt to distinguish fetal dismemberment inside the
womb from the intact D & E skull-crushing procedure. 1 70 Assuredly,
Brief of Sandra Cano, supra note 107 (quoting 178 affidavits of post-abortive women
reporting adverse psychological effects that abortion caused them).
164 Specifically, the Court stated:
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must
struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she
learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a
physician to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her
unborn child, a child assuming the human form.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. These disputed adverse effects of abortion on women are
obviously a huge flashpoint in our culture today, but the issue is one that the law-
and society-will have to resolve. Whether this obverse health concern of Carhart is a
result of the experience of nearly thirty-five years of widespread legal abortion in the
United States, or whether it is simply a political weapon being wielded for ideological
reasons, which must necessarily lie outside the cognizance of our government, will
undoubtedly be deeply and passionately contested for years to come.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1633-34 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note (Supp. V 2005)).
167 The Stenberg majority's sanctioning of constitutional protection for both intact
D & E and nonintact D & E implies that the government cannot distinguish one as
being more akin to infanticide than the other, and thus that distinction was left to the
individual judgment of the physician.
168 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633.
169 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
170 See id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[T]he most common method of per-
forming previability second trimester abortions is no less distressing or susceptible to
gruesome description."); see also Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("Nonintact D & E could equally be characterized as brutal, involving as it does tear-
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part of the concern of Justices Ginsburg and Stevens is that if intact
D & E is truly ethically indistinguishable from nonintact D & E, then
the Court might face that fact some day and decide that nonintact D
& E may also be banned. While the crossfire over this particular ques-
tion necessarily involves highly evocative language, taking a step back,
it can be recognized that Justices Ginsburg and Stevens may have a
point, 71 and that the Court will undoubtedly have to grapple with this
in the future now that Carhart has squarely placed decisionmaking
authority on this issue not in the physician's hands, but in the hands
of the legislatures.1 72
Finally, a notable corollary interest recognized in Carhart is that
of a concern "with the effects on the medical community and on its
reputation caused by the practice of partial-birth abortion."'173 While
Roe did not expressly state that the medical community is responsible
for maintaining its own standards and ensuring the quality of its own
reputation, this was implied in its refusal to allow any state regulation
of abortion in the first trimester, and to allow state regulation in the
second trimester only to keep abortion safe. 174 Roe took the fact that
first trimester abortion is statistically safer for the life of the woman
than natural childbirth 7 5 as a license for the medical community to
regulate itself in this area; it was not the state's business to make first
trimester abortions even safer. Carhart turned this approach on its
head; now legislatures may seek to maintain the high regard society
has for the medical community by requiring that it not perform proce-
dures repugnant to its sense of a physician's role in promoting life
and well-being. 176
ing a fetus apart and ripping off its limbs." (internal quotation marks, citations, and
alterations omitted)).
171 Inevitably, this sort of line drawing may involve distinctions that seem highly
arbitrary and unfounded, cf Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
870 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.), fueled more by pas-
sionate interest in securing rights for either the woman or the fetus than by rational
decisionmaking.
172 "Congress could nonetheless conclude that the type of abortion proscribed by
the Act requires specific regulation because it implicates additional ethical and moral
concerns that justify a special prohibition." Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633. In Casey, the
Court stated that "[c] onsistent with other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw
lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification. But
courts may not. We must justify the lines we draw." Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (joint
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter,JJ.) (justifying the viability line as being the
point at which a woman's liberty interest gives way to the life interest of the fetus).
173 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633.
174 See supra note 26.
175 See supra note 26.
176 The Carhart Court sanctioned Congress' findings that
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Noting the interests highlighted by the Carhart majority accentu-
ates what the Court was saying: that the lack of a health exception in a
law restricting abortion does not automatically mean that the law has
the "purpose... [of] 'plac[ing] a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion.'- 177 It also accentuates the rational basis
test announced by the Court for testing the purpose of a law restrict-
ing abortion:
[w]here it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an
undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain
procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate
interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for
life, including lfe of the unborn.1 78
Thus, at least when testing the legitimate purpose of a law restricting a
particular method of abortion, there is reason to believe that it may
always withstand the rational-basis purpose test 179 because any law
restricting abortion could, by definition, further the state's interest in
promoting respect for the life of the unborn. After Carhart, legisla-
tures now have something to say about the medical profession's atti-
tude toward the unborn and the physician veto retained by Casey is no
longer absolute in its ability to facially invalidate a law lacking a health
exception.
[p]artial-birth abortion ... confuses the medical, legal, and ethical duties of
physicians to preserve and promote life, as the physician acts directly against
the physical life of a child, whom he or she had just delivered, all but the
head, out of the womb, in order to end that life.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note (Supp. V 2005)); cf Snead,
supra note 154, at 5-6 ("In other words, the purpose of the law was actually to prevent
the moral degradation of society. The Court thus held that the governmental interest
in preventing this moral harm outweighed the individual's belief that a particular
abortion procedure might be necessary for her health.").
177 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1635 (emphasis added) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.)).
178 Id. at 1633 (emphasis added).
179 Whether such a law will withstand the effects test is another question. See infra
Part IV.B. Carhart's language is limited to this particular circumstance, where another
abortion procedure is available for the gestation period in question. It will remain a
question until the next major abortion battle before the Court implicating a health
exception before we know whether the Court will limit the seismic removal of the
absolute health exception requirement of Roe to the facts of Carhart, or whether it will
extend it to future fact situations.
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B. The Meaning of Disagreement over Health Risks: Testing the
Effects of a Law
A law will be considered an unconstitutional undue burden on a
woman's right to an abortion if it has the effect of subjecting women to
significant health risks. °80 Like Stenberg, the Carhart Court faced hotly
contested opinions about whether the Act "creates significant health
risks for women."1 8 1 Medical disagreement existed and was heavily
documented, 8 2 but the question, as in Stenberg, was what to do in the
face of that disagreement. Could the Act "stand when this medical
uncertainty persists"?18 3
At this point, it should come as no surprise that the answer was a
resounding "yes." The Carhart majority declared that "physicians are
not entitled to ignore regulations that direct them to use reasonable
alternative procedures"' 8 4 and that "[t]he law need not give abortion
doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical practice, nor
should it elevate their status above other physicians in the medical
community.' 85
It is well known that Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia
and Thomas have held the position for many years that the Constitu-
tion has nothing to say about abortion and that it is a question that
should be left to the legislatures of the states.' 86 In an all but explicit
overruling of Stenberg, the Carhart majority paid homage to that posi-
tion by holding that legislatures could properly consider issues of mar-
ginal safety-a balancing of risks-so long as the regulation was
180 See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1635 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 880 (1992)).
181 Id.
182 See id. at 1635-36. Congress had found that intact D & E is never a necessary
abortion procedure. See id. at 1624. Meanwhile, "[t]he district courts had compiled a
vast evidentiary record of medical opinion that intact D & E is a recognized method to
protect the woman's health in appropriate cases." Gostin, supra note 5, at 1563; see
also Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1636 (discussing the findings of the three district courts to
pass on the issue); Snead, supra note 154, at 5 ("Opponents of the law argued that
there were imaginable circumstances in which the procedure would be the safest
method of abortion; defenders retorted that there were always safe alternatives availa-
ble (including the in utero killing of the fetus followed by intact dilation and
extraction).").
183 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1636.
184 Id.
185 Id.; see also Planned Parenthoood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (joint
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) ("[T] he physician-patient relation here
is entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts.").
186 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 944-79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 979-1002
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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"rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends."' 187 Noting the existence
of medical uncertainty will not be the veto that Stenberg made it to be.
Expressly laying to rest the physician veto, the Court declared that
"[t]he Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over
whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman's
health" given available alternative and safe procedures. 88
The Court's decision in Carhart would have been much more dif-
ficult to reach had the Stenberg Court maintained the Roe and Casey
bright-line health exception requirement. Since Stenberg turned the
health exception rule into a balancing question, the Court in Carhart
was able to engage in a functional analysis similar to that of Stenberg,
while attaching a polar opposite significance to medical uncertainty
claims raised by physicians in favor of permitting intact D & E. As
Justice Kennedy indicated he would like to do in his dissent in
Stenberg, the Carhart Court declared the physician veto a thing of the
past. 189
C. Taking Stock: The Significance of Carhart
The silver lining for those alarmed by the seismic shift that Car-
hart represents is that a court may always read the health exception
into a law in an as-applied challenge.
[An as-applied challenge] is the proper manner to protect the
health of the woman if it can be shown that in discrete and well-
defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in
which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used. In an as-
applied challenge the nature of the medical risk can be better quan-
tified and balanced than in a facial attack. 190
In such a challenge, the Court might engage in an analysis analogous
to that which it used to uphold the medical emergency provision in
Casey.19' It seems that the point for the Carhart majority is that the law
would not be struck down on its face when it furthers what the Court
considers to be important state interests. Justice Ginsburg stated in
her dissent that " [t] he very purpose of a health exception is to protect
women in exceptional cases."'192 Given the Court's implicit rejection of
the arguments that intact D & E was necessary for the psychological
health of the woman who preferred it to the dismemberment method
187 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638.
188 Id.
189 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
190 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638-39.
191 See supra note 105.
192 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., disssenting).
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of nonintact D & E,193 it appears thatJustice Kennedy and the Carhart
majority are saying, 'Justice Ginsburg, that's exactly the point."
Carhart might be read as a decision of only symbolic, moral, and/
or political value. The strict construction the Court gave to the Par-
tial-Birth Abortion Ban Act led it to conclude that the scope of the
Act's prohibition was narrow and that prosecutorial discretion would
be limited. 194 Additionally, as Justice Ginsburg warned the Court's
majority, "[t]he [Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act] saves not a single
fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abor-
tion."1 95 One might even read the Court itself as suggesting that the
Act was constitutional because it was merely symbolic, for a woman's
ability to obtain late-term abortions is not hindered at all, as Justice
Ginsburg implicitly noted: the far more common late-term abortion
procedure, nonintact D & E, would still be available. Thus, there is a
sense in which the law was a mere "'structural mechanism by which
the State . . . may express profound respect for the life of the
unborn"' because women may still "'exercise . . . the right to
choose.' "196
Despite that symbolic aspect of Carhart, the decision has real
teeth. Carhart plainly contradicts the part of Stenberg that revived judi-
cial deference and solicitude to the privacy of a physician's choices, a
physician's autonomy, and a physician's judgment, inaugurated in
Roe. The argument that a physician ought to have absolute clinical
freedom in the abortion context, 97 has been laid to rest-at least for
now-by the Court's holding that the state has an interest in protect-
ing the life of the fetus that cannot be automatically vetoed by facial
attacks against its laws for failure to include a health exception.
Though Congress' findings contained some factually incorrect state-
193 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 05-1382),
available at www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/05-1382
.pdf ("It's a very personal decision how the woman who has made this very difficult
moral/religious decision to end her pregnancy.. how does she want the fetus to
undergo demise?").
194 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1629.
195 Id. at 1647 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 1627 (majority opinion) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter,JJ.)).
197 See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 5, at 1563 ("[The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act]
creates a chilling effect on the freedom to practice in accordance with the exercise of
clinical judgment .... Provided that medical procedures are recognized by distin-
guished medical opinion and chosen by patients in consultation with their physicians,
these therapeutic decisions [to have an abortion] appear to be outside the legitimate
sphere of state power.").
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ments,19 8 "[a] zero tolerance policy would strike down legitimate
abortion regulations, like the present one, if some part of the medical
community were disinclined to follow the proscription.' ' 199 Society,
through Congress, has now been allowed to act in the face of reasona-
ble medical disagreement about the safety and preferability of a
method of abortion.
CONCLUSION
This Note has traced the birth, life, and eventual death of the
physician veto from Roe through Carhart as a means of understanding
the meaning of Carhart. While gender equality theorists may not
appreciate the outcome of Carhart, they ought to appreciate the impli-
cation of this discussion because the abortion debate may now take
place on its core terms: the interests of women and the interests of
unborn humans. These core terms, including the interests of women,
need not hide any longer behind the law's granting of a veto power to
ideologically driven physicians on either side of the debate. If Carhart
has any staying power, it has enabled a full flowering of this debate by
removing the physician veto so unique to the abortion context, and by
clearing the way for a richer understanding of what interests are at
stake for women and fetuses. It has allowed society, through its
elected representatives, to exercise a newly, if only marginally,
increased degree of autonomy in allowing the myriad voices and con-
cerns surrounding abortion to enter into discussion with each other
without judicial use of a physician's veto to silence the debate. Cer-
tainly, physicians' voices will play a necessary, but ancillary, role in the
future. That ancillary role, if accepted gracefully, will add to an
understanding of the interests at stake by providing an unbiased,
objective, and expert understanding of women's health issues and the
nature of the fetus, but will no longer inhibit the core issues from
being considered on their own terms. That is the meaning of Carhart.
198 See Carhart, 127 U.S. at 1637-38. Specifically, it was incorrect for Congress to
claim that no medical school taught the intact D & E procedure and to claim that a
medical consensus existed that the prohibited procedure is never medically necessary.
See id.
199 Id. at 1638.
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